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Theo A. F. Kuipers 
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES AND THE CASE OF ABDUCTION 
REPLY TO ROBERTO FESTA 
In his essay Roberto Festa elaborates the issues of (dis)similarities and possible 
interactions between logic and philosophy of science put forward by Johan van 
Benthem, in 1982, primarily in view of ICR, but also in view of SiS. Hence, 
the essay provides a natural transition from Volume 1, which mainly deals 
with topics of ICR, to Volume 2, which mainly deals with topics of SiS. In 
particular, as Festa makes clear, for the comparison of logic and philosophy of 
science it is plausible to emphasize the dominant research perspective in both 
ICR and SiS, viz. explicative research. The nature of this type of research is 
only explicitly thematized in SiS (pp. 8, 9, 18, 58-9, 248, 263-4). Festa is 
certainly right in stressing that the (plausible) definition of progress in 
explicative research presupposes the falsifiability of provisional explications, 
while the specific argumentation that an evident example or non-example is 
treated properly or that a condition of adequacy is, or is not, fulfilled may 
amount to proving a more or less deep theorem, or characterizing a more or 
less interesting countermodel. These points illustrate the claim in ICR (p. 130-
1) and SiS (p. 248) that (explicative) research in philosophy should satisfy, 
mutatis mutandis, the three general principles of testability (PT), separate 
evaluation (PSE) and improvement (PI), where the latter presupposes the 
principle of comparative evaluation (PCE). Hence, Festa’s essay pleases me 
very much. In this reply I would like to concentrate on the role of “unintended 
consequences,” neglected by Festa, in speaking of progress in the empirical 
sciences, logic, and philosophy (of science). Moreover, I shall illustrate it by 
the recent finding of the straightforward abductive nature of Inference to the 
Best Theory (IBT), as opposed to the standard conception of Inference to the 
Best Explanation (IBE). 
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Unintended Consequences in the Empirical and Non-Empirical Sciences 
Although Festa refers to several paragraphs and passages in SiS dealing with 
concept explication, including the definition of progress in explicative research 
(SiS, p. 264), surprisingly enough he neglects my remark about unintended 
explications:
However, it is also considered to be very important that the proposed explication turns out 
to give rise to unintended explications, that is, to satisfactory explications of related 
concepts and intuitions. This type of success is the analogue of the extra, i.e., predictive 
or external, success of explanatory programs. Again the question is whether this form of 
success is formally defensible as a necessary condition for progress, but the fact remains 
that in practice this type of explicative success plays an important role. (SiS, p. 18) 
In ICR, Subsection 7.5.1, I deal extensively with the last mentioned question 
regarding explanatory programs in view of the basic version of the structuralist 
theory of truthlikeness and conclude: 
In sum, ad hoc repair of a theory will seldom be a real improvement without unexpected 
extra success. In other words, comparative HD-evaluation of an ad hoc repair will either 
lead to unexpected extra successes of the new theory or extra successes of the old theory 
that could have been, but were not, explicitly expected before. Hence, besides some 
qualifications, the intuitions of Popper and Lakatos with respect to ad hoc repairs and 
novel facts are largely justified. [However, I]nstead of a ban on ad hoc changes, they can 
be allowed, provided they are subjected to comparative HD-[evaluation] with the original 
theory.  (ICR, pp. 168-9)1
Hence, the first question is whether there is a similar story to tell about ad hoc 
improvements of explications. Unfortunately, the detailed argumentation in 
Subsection 7.5.1 referred to leans heavily on the unknown but fixed character 
of the postulated target, the truth, that is, the set of nomic possibilities 
determined by the domain and the vocabulary. In contrast – although less 
extreme than in the case of the material version of explicative research, that is, 
design research (SiS, pp. 282-3) – explicative research is guided by a more or 
less known target which may or may not be changed. Hence, the prospects for 
an analogous way of reasoning are not impressive. 
 However this may be, the intuition stated in the first quote remains: an 
explication of a concept generating related but unintended explications is more 
impressive than an explication that does not. Fortunately, close reading of this 
plausible specification of the intuition suggests that the above quoted 
comparison with ad hoc repairs of empirical theories may not be adequate. In 
the case of ad hoc repairs we are talking about a given theory and a revised 
version that solves a given problem of the former. In the case of unintended 
                                                          
1 Note that I inserted ‘However’ at the beginning of the last sentence in order to stress the 
deviating moral. Moreover, I replaced ‘HD testing’ by ‘HD evaluation’, since using the former 
expression here must have been a slip of the falsificationist pen. 
Reply to Roberto Festa 523
explications we are primarily comparing two explications of the same concept 
in terms of their side effects. Hence, suppose we have two explications of a 
given concept that are equally successful in the sense suggested by my 
definition of explicative progress (SiS, p. 264), quoted by Festa. Suppose, 
moreover, that the one generates one or more explications of, apparently, 
related concepts and the other does not: as far as we know, of course. In other 
words, the one leads to conceptual unification whereas the other does not. In 
several contributions and replies in both volumes there have been hints about 
non-empirical merits of empirical theories that may be taken into account in 
addition to empirical ones. Here we seem to come across a variant of this type 
of merits of concept explication in addition to the straightforward merits in 
terms of evident examples and non-examples and conditions of adequacy. 
However, in the empirical case it was, at least sometimes, possible to argue 
that non-empirical merits are functional for truth approximation in an indirect 
way, viz. in the case of a certain type of aesthetic criteria (Kuipers 2002). In 
the present case of conceptual unification such an argument seems less likely, 
roughly for the same reasons as we have met before: the target is more or less 
known and changeable. However, if we take the set of all concepts that 
become related by an explication of the concept we started with, we can of 
course apply a generalized version of the definition of explicative progress. 
Then we will find that the resulting set of explications of the set of concepts 
unified in this sense, starting from an explication of a given concept, is better 
than an alternative explication of this given concept that is equally successful 
with respect to this concept but has nothing to offer with respect to the 
concepts that are related to it by the first explication. However, to get a fair 
comparison one has to bring in the best available, presumably isolated, 
explications of these concepts. Even if all the resultant one-by-one 
comparisons show equal success, we are inclined to say that the unified 
explication of a set of concepts is superior to the sum total of disconnected 
explications of them. However, it is again difficult to see how this could be 
functional for truth approximation. Hence, unification remains a non-empirical 
merit of concept explication. 
 So far we have assumed that one explication of a given concept was 
compared with another existing explication. However, the unifying merit of 
explications of concepts generating unintended explications may be 
generalized in the sense that such explications are better than any (already 
existing or not yet existing) explication that is equally successful with respect 
to an initial concept but does not generate related explications. 
 Note that a similar story can be told about theoretical unification. If one 
theory has links with other theories whereas an (existing or hypothetical) 
empirically equally successful competitor remains isolated, this certainly is 
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considered to be a merit of the former. David Atkinson argues in his 
contribution to the companion volume that the main merit of string theory is 
this kind of theoretical unification. He even suggests that the research program 
underlying string theory may have to be seen as exemplifying a type of 
program that differs from the four standard types characterized in SiS, that is, 
descriptive, explanatory, design and explicative programs. A research program 
may merely aim at unification of (domains and) theories, that is, aim at a 
unification that seems to have, for practical reasons, no prospects of empirical 
evaluation.
Inference to the Best Theory as a Case of Abduction 
The general merit of conceptual unification suggested above certainly applies 
to the structuralist explication of the notion of truthlikeness presented in detail 
in ICR, relative to equally successful but isolated explications of this notion 
and of its relatives as generated by this explication. In ICR I summarize its 
merits in this respect as follows: 
… the structuralist theory of truthlikeness has generated a number of unexpected and  
unintended results. The most important ones are: 
– a justification of fundamental methodological rules, in particular the rule to choose 
the most successful theory (Subsection 7.3.3.), 
– an explanation of the success of the natural sciences in terms of truth approximation 
(Subsection 7.3.3.), 
– an explanation and justification of the non-falsificationist behavior of scientists 
(Section 6.2., 6.3. and 7.3.), 
– a corrective explication of so-called ‘inference to the best explanation’ (Subsection 
7.5.3, [called “inference to the best theory,” see also Kuipers 2004]), 
– an explication of Popper’s bad luck, i.e., the convincing failure of his at first sight 
very plausible definition of truthlikeness (Section 8.1.), 
– an explication of the correspondence theory of truth as an intralevel intuition 
(Section 8.2.), 
– … an explication of dialectical concepts [Section 8.3] (ICR, p. 198). 
Since the appearance of ICR in 2000, two other unintended explications can be 
added to this list, viz.
– an explication of the intuition of many scientists and philosophers that aesthetic 
criteria are indirectly functional for empirical progress and even truth approximation 
(Kuipers 2002), 
– an explication of the intuition of several philosophers that ‘inference to the best 
explanation’ is a kind of abduction in the sense of Peirce (Kuipers 2004). 
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The last mentioned explicative success is of a special kind. As included in the 
first list, the structuralist explication of truthlikeness generated a corrective 
explication of the idea of the “inference to the best explanation” (IBE), leading 
to “inference to the best theory” (IBT). The last success may also be seen as a 
proof of the claim that the generated explication of IBE, viz. IBT, satisfies the 
plausible condition of adequacy that an explication of IBE should make it an 
abductive rule of inference in the paradigmatic sense of Peirce.
I would like to give a rough idea of the basic versions of these related 
explications. In ICR I argued that IBE should not be explicated as “inference 
to the best unfalsified theory, if any, as true,” as is usually suggested, but as 
“inference to the best theory, if any, whether falsified or not, as the closest to 
the truth,” i.e., as IBT. In my forthcoming paper I argue that the latter, but not 
the former, satisfies the crucial second premise of Peirce’s scheme for 
abduction (Peirce 1958, p. 189): 
The surprising fact C is observed. 
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course. 
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. 
That is, the hypothesis of being closer to the truth
2
 makes a matter of course of 
the, as such, surprising fact of remaining empirically more successful,
3
 viz. 
due to the Success Theorem, see Festa’s paper. In contrast, the hypothesis of 
being true does not do so. This may be an unintended merit of the structuralist 
explication of the notion of truthlikeness that can be particularly appreciated 
by logicians interested in abductive logic. However this may be, it at least 
illustrates once again that relatively simple theorems may nevertheless be very 
important because of their far-reaching consequences with respect to the 
unification of concepts and intuitions. 
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